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EVIDENTIALISM AND THEOLOGY: 
A REPLY TO KAUFMAN 
Scott A. Shalkowski 
In "Evidentialism: A Theologian's Response," Gordon D. Kaufman presents 
some reasons that explain why, given the renewed interest in the philosophy of 
religion, theologians have paid relatively little attention to the work of contem-
porary philosophers. Philosophers have worked predominantly within the frame-
work of traditional formulations of theological matters, and contemporary 
theologians have reasons for abandoning portions of this framework. In this 
discussion, I argue that the rationale Kaufman presents does not warrant aban-
doning central features of the traditional Christian theological framework. 
In "Evidentialism: A Theologian's Response," Gordon D. Kaufman suggests 
that theologians find contemporary philosophical discussions of evidential-
ism uninteresting because these discussions presuppose a questionable theo-
logical framework. l Kaufman and other contemporary theologians base their 
doubts about this framework on information that was either not available to 
or not widely recognized by earlier theologians. While some have concluded 
that this new knowledge justifies the rejection of religious belief in general, 
Kaufman draws the weaker conclusion that it merely exposes difficulties for 
traditional theology. Kaufman bases his case against traditional theological 
assumptions on the recognition of three things: (i) religious diversity, (ii) the 
relations between symbols, experience, and thought and (iii) the responsibil-
ity of Christianity for grand-scale evils. In this paper I shall explain the flaws 
in Kaufman's inferences. Though I shall not argue that the traditional way of 
understanding Christian theology is well-founded, I want to expose why 
Kaufman's case for a new framework is ill-founded. I conjecture that since 
many theologians seem to accept inferences like Kaufman's, sometimes un-
critically, philosophers of religion have largely ignored contemporary theol-
ogy.2 Finally, I will argue that even if Kaufman's reasoning were acceptable, 
he and other contemporary theologians cannot be wholly cavalier regarding 
the issues surrounding evidentialism. These issues bear on the very case they 
make for a more modem theological framework. 
1. Religious Diversity 
Philosophers of religion have typically been concerned with (i) the coherence 
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of the concepts that are utilized by traditional theology and (ii) the rationality 
of believing various religious propositions that embed these concepts. Kauf-
man points out that theologians are currently interested in more basic ques-
tions. Do the terms 'God' or 'Christ' pick out concepts that allow us to 
formulate the most fruitful theology? How did these terms function in the 
works of earlier Christian writers?3 The first question is obviously related to 
what philosophers are concerned with when inquiring into the coherence of 
traditional theistic concepts. The second is related to the philosopher's con-
cern over the rationality of religious belief in at least one way. We must know 
how 'God' functioned in the New Testament, for example, in order to know 
what propositions the Apostle Paul intended to assert when writing the book 
of Romans. Only after we know what propositions are at issue can we sensibly 
ask whether it is rational to believe them. However, there is nothing in either 
of these two theological projects that in any way warrants overthrowing 
traditional theological frameworks. Focusing only on the first question, re-
flections that demonstrate the incoherence of a particular understanding of 
omnipotence would warrant the search for a new framework only if omnip-
otence under the incoherent interpretation were an essential feature of the 
old framework. Otherwise, one can conclude perfectly well that either the 
interpretation exposed as incoherent is not what 'omnipotent' means anyway 
or that a proper understanding of God does not require the concept of om-
nipotence. Either way, traditional God-talk is unthreatened. So, the reasons 
theologians have for ignoring current discussions of evidentialism must cut 
more deeply than those I have mentioned, if they are to be sufficient. 
Kaufman seems to think that there is some inconsistency between claiming 
that Christianity contains normative and distinctive truth-claims and a "care-
ful, appreciative study" of other religious traditions.4 But, there is no incon-
sistency in this at all. In fact, one can be fully convinced that Christianity is 
the only correct system of religious truth and that all others are wrong to the 
extent that they are inconsistent with Christianity, and still treat other tradi-
tions and their followers with the utmost respect, even gleaning truth from 
them when this is consistent with Christianity. Claiming that Christianity is 
true does not entail that it contains every truth and, hence, that the study of 
other traditions, religious and nonreligious, is worthless. Hence, the recogni-
tion that there are alternative religious traditions which contain truths worthy 
of our attention is not a sufficient reason to cease doing theology in terms of 
traditional concepts, trying to determine what the doctrines of the incarnation 
and original sin are all about, or claiming that these doctrines are true. One 
can continue doing all these things and even admit with Kaufman that "com-
parison with other symbols and practices-for example, those of Buddhists 
or Jews (or Marxists)-will illuminate dimensions of Christian faith and life 
and symbols which have remained hidden to direct internalist approaches to 
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theological questions."~ The recognition of diversity within or without the 
Christian tradition warrants, at most, a type of epistemological humility. 
Given that others seem sincere in their beliefs and practices (maybe more so 
than I), I might be subject to error in spite of all I have done. Indeed, it is 
arguable that such humility is required by Christian teaching. But, such hu-
mility in no way entails that one must relinquish the idea that Christianity 
contains significant, unique truth-claims. A firmly held and vigorously de-
fended belief in a given system is perfectly compatible with an openness to 
new sources of truth as well as continued search for truth that may lead one 
to change beliefs. 
Recognizing religious diversity would provide grounds for a tentativeness 
about one's belief in Christian doctrines only if one could see that it is at 
least as rational to believe one of these alternatives. An alternative might be 
at least as rational to believe when compared with Christianity only if it is 
either (i) equally or better grounded in evidence, (ii) at least as properly 
believed basically, or (iii) equally justified and does at least as good a job of 
providing meaning for one's life. There must be something about an alterna-
tive that recommends it to us beyond its mere existence, since the construc-
tion of an alternative is really a trivial matter. Connecting an alternative to 
the world and our life in the world is the difficulty. This is to say that 
determining when an alternative system of belief warrants our attention re-
quires that we first have some idea about what would make it proper to 
believe the system and to change from one to the other. But, far from obvi-
ating current discussions of evidentialism in particular and the rationality of 
religious belief in general, any inference from religious diversity to the sec-
ond-rate status of traditional Christian theology presupposes some verdicts 
on these matters. So, religious diversity does not warrant disinterest in con-
cerns over rationality or evidentialism. 
2. Conceptual Relativity 
Perhaps the devaluing of traditional theology is warranted on the basis of 
contemporary claims that traditional theology was not dropped from heaven 
on golden tablets, but is in some sense a function of the cultural, religious, 
and linguistic frameworks within which it arose. If this setting had been 
different in significant ways, as presumably the settings were substantially 
different where other traditions arose, the theology handed to the contempo-
rary western world would have been cast in different terms. This, of course, 
is a very large and subtle issue which I will not attempt to address in great 
detail here.6 Suppose, for the sake of argument, we grant this sort of cultural, 
religious and linguistic relativity. As with the inference from religious diver-
sity, the inference from the context-dependence of theological frameworks to 
the "problematic character of all so-called 'religious truth-claims'" is faulty 
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as it stands. Suppose that we would not be thinking about religious matters 
in terms of 'God' rather than 'Brahman', if it had not been for the milieu of 
the Hebrew tradition bequeathed to the early church. Suppose, further, that 
the Hebrew tradition itself would not have been formulated in its terms, if 
the early Hebrew writers had been in a very different setting. The most that 
follows from this is that if there are truths about God, the divine nature, the 
incarnation, original sin, etc., we might have missed out on finding them or 
finding them plausible. If concepts are just the mental tools with which we 
approach and communicate about the world, then, as with other tasks, if we 
do not have the relevant tools at hand, we may not be able to do a particular 
job. We might not have discovered the truths we have (if any) about God and 
God's activity in the world, or we might have found them to comport so 
poorly with other beliefs formulated with different concepts that we might 
have thought that all propositions involving traditional God-talk were pat-
ently absurd. None of this, however, in any way shows that it is problematic 
to claim that propositions involving these concepts are true. The truth or 
falsity of these propositions is a function of whether there is a God who has 
a certain nature and performed certain actions in the world. If so, some of 
the traditionally Christian propositions are true; if not, they are false. This is 
so, regardless of whether the concepts that are part of these propositions are 
concepts we might not have used in thinking about the world. My six-year 
old daughter's lack of a conceptual handle on quantum indeterminacy has no 
more or less bearing on the truth of contemporary physics than someone else's 
lack of a conceptual handle on the notion of God has with the truth of certain 
propositions about God. All that follows from this sort of relativity is that 
different people with different conceptual schemes may arrive at different 
theories about the world. As long as these theories do not conflict, there is 
no reason, on the basis of conceptual relativity alone, to conclude that claims 
regarding the truth of separately-derived theories are dubious. Truth is called 
into question, however, if they are incompatible. It is crucial to note here that 
it is their incompatibility that warrants the conclusion that at least one must 
involve some falsehood(s), not the relativity of their genesis. Cultural, reli-
gious, and linguistic relativity in no way warrant the claim that the concepts 
used in traditional Christian theology are ill-suited for the task of theologizing 
about ultimate reality, nor do they warrant a religious relativism which places 
all religious traditions on equal footing. 
The fact that many Christian writings and doctrines might, for all we know, 
be articulated symbolically with multi-leveled meanings and without the main 
intent to be truth-conveying, also fails to entail the rejection of traditional 
theology. I know of no reason to think that all of the Biblical writings should 
be construed as nonsymbolic. It is quite plausible to think that, even in the 
process of trying to convey truth, the New Testament writers were, at times, 
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more interested in motivating people to action or comforting those in distress 
and confusion. Philosophers of religion may not have addressed these matters 
often, not because there is some tension between these features of Christian 
writings and traditional theology, but because philosophy of religion by its 
nature focuses on the intelligibility of certain propositions and the rationality 
of belief in them. Kaufman provides us with no insight as to how the multi-
faceted nature of religious discourse shows a flaw in traditional theology. If 
one were to claim that having a correct philosophical theology is all there is 
to religious belief or that the analysis of key concepts is all there is to 
understanding the significance of religious discourse, then Kaufman's point 
would be poignant. But, it is doubtful that philosophers, theologians, pastoral 
leaders, and ordinary believers have made these claims so central to the 
traditional theological framework that any weakness in its general structure 
has been exposed by Kaufman. 
Kaufman says that we need to recognize that religious claims are "to pres-
ent a framework from within which basic orientation and meaning for the 
whole of human life can be found," and that we must understand why we are 
theorizing in terms of 'God' before we can appropriately consider the rele-
vance of evidence to rational religious belief.1 Again, even if it is right that 
religious claims constitute such a framework, this is not at all incompatible 
with traditional theology containing a significant amount of objectively-de-
termined truth. Surely, not any arbitrarily-chosen collection of truths, even 
religious truths, will perform the important religious function of providing a 
comprehensive framework within which the meaning for all of human life 
may be found. That is a tall order for any collection of truths. But, granting 
that any satisfactory religious system must perform this function, how does 
this function undermine a given tradition's claims to truth, even if showing 
the meaning of life is the primary task of religious systems? We might judge 
competing systems on the basis of how well they perform this function and 
use their performance as evidence for the general truth of the system(s) that 
meet this standard best, or simply use it to determine which system, if any, 
warrants our allegiance. This constraint on satisfactory religious systems, 
however, does not undermine the claim that some religious system actually 
contains truths; rather, the constraint entails that the relevant religious system 
contain truths. If some measure of truth cannot be extracted from a system 
that purports to be a framework for the meaningfulness of life, whether on a 
literal or metaphorical level, then the system cannot provide such a frame-
work, unless it does so in spite of itself. This claim, of course, hinges on what 
it means for a system to perform this function. If a system is said to provide 
a meaningful structure for life if it enables believers to act in ways which 
make them feel significant in the grand scheme of things, then truth is not 
needed. But, unless there is nothing to the distinction between thinking that 
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one's life matters in the overall scheme of things and one's life really mat-
tering (and I know of no argument which undermines this distinction), the 
(approximate) truth of the framework that leads one to believe that one's life 
is meaningful is absolutely crucial. If religious traditions are wrong with 
respect to certain claims, human existence has no meaning at all and some 
of the specific actions they recommend as particularly meaningful are, in 
reality, worthless. Again, Kaufman leads us to consider features of religion 
which are important, but which are not inconsistent with the truth and worth 
of traditional Christian theology. He has given us no reason to think that the 
traditional concepts are second-rate and that others are better, nor has he 
given us reason to think that propositions formulated with them are neither 
true nor rationally believed to be true by some. 
Suppose we were to investigate sympathetically other religious traditions. 
What would be the point? To see what they have to offer. But, what do they 
have to offer, if not something based on some truths not contained in the 
Christian tradition? Otherwise, the payoff could be only comforting illusions. 
Yet, Kaufman's points regarding the relativity of experience and theory are 
completely general and do not apply in any special way to the Christian 
tradition. So, they can be applied to these other systems. If relativity under-
mines claiming truth for Christian doctrines, it does so equally for any other 
system we care to evaluate, thus undermining one strong motivation for 
looking elsewhere. We might allow this consequence and think that there is 
instrumental good in such an investigation of other systems. Adopting one 
set of religious beliefs might get one to do what is best or most fully human 
more effectively than adopting another. But, this presupposes the truth of 
certain normative claims, in particular those regarding what is best and most 
fully human. These claims are often grounded in, or presuppose the truth of, 
other propositions within the relevant tradition. Relativity will apply to these 
propositions and, again, undercut the point of the recommended open-minded 
religious search. 
3. Christian Responsibility for Evil 
The third motivation for abandoning traditional theological concepts is that 
it now seems that Christian faith, Christian ways of understanding the world 
and the human place within the world, a powerful Christian sense of divine 
authorization and thus superiority over other religions, Christian imperialism, 
Christian racism and sexism, and other characteristics and qualities of the 
Christian religion and of "Christian civilization,'· bear some significant re-
sponsibility for [some of the appalling evils of the twentieth century].8 
How so, exactly? What is obvious is that some purveyors of hate claim 
Biblical authority for their attitudes and actions, though this no more shows 
that the Christian tradition is responsible for instances of genocide than 
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someone's waiving Russell's Why I Am Not A Christian during a sermon 
shows Russell was tacitly a theist and responsible for the success of an 
evangelistic campaign. Recently, there has been a veritable industry of writers 
attempting to show that imperialism, racism, and sexism were in no way part 
of the considered view of the writers of the New Testament. Given the his-
torical context, recommendations which might be improperly imperialistic, 
racist, or sexist now were perfectly proper and compatible with the recogni-
tion that all humans are properly valued in the sight of God. Whether this 
case can be firmly grounded in historical and textual research is a crucial 
question. Such research must fail, however, before we can warrantedly assert 
that it is the Christian tradition itself that is responsible for various heinous 
crimes against humanity rather than some benighted souls who misapplied 
the Biblical texts to suit their own (unChristian) purposes. To the extent that 
." we are aware of historical/contextual factors that infect our theories, be-
liefs, and practices, it is plausible to think that nonChristian factors have 
adversely affected the behavior and attitudes of Christian people.9 But, 
surely, we are not compelled to baptize every attitude, belief, and action 
of those who claim the title • Christian' as genuinely Christian. Taking 
place in an environment in which Christianity is the dominant religion is 
likewise insufficient. 
4. Evidentialism and Theology 
So far, Kaufman has not presented a good reason to think that "radical re-
construction of central concepts and symbols of the Christian faith" is nec-
essary.l0 If this is correct, then neither has he given a good reason to think 
that questions about evidentialism which are internal to the Christian tradition 
are of little theological interest. Further, a positive case can be made to show 
the significance of concerns over evidence for traditional beliefs. In fact, 
contemporary theology itself tacitly legitimizes these concerns. 
Even if we grant that certain issues are logically prior to the inquiry about 
rational belief, it looks as though Kaufman himself relies on certain com-
mitments regarding the rationality of particular religiously-relevant prop-
ositions, specifically those regarding the nature of revelation. So, while 
Kaufman eschews inquiring about the evidence for propositions like God 
has forgiven my sins or God is speaking to me now, since they are formu-
lated in terms of traditional God-talk, he cannot avoid all inquiry about 
evidence for religiously relevant propositions. To see that Kaufman's pos-
ture on the nature of revelation relies on certain assumptions about the 
relevance and adequacy of evidence for such propositions, consider what 
it is that makes some particular writing an instance of revelation. There 
are at least two ways to understand the concept of revelation. The first, which 
is the more traditional, is that a necessary condition for something to be a 
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revelation is that it have God or some suitable divinely-inspired authority as 
its source. So, the Bible is a genuine instance of revelation, only if God was 
instrumental in inspiring writers to write various things, draw certain lessons 
from history, or recommend particular courses of action, etc. According to 
the second model, books of religious revelation are simply those which con-
tain a humanly-constructed theory about the nature of God, God's will for 
humanity, etc. Kaufman adopts this second approach to the Christian writings 
when he says that "we do not know how the images and metaphors in terms 
of which we conceive God apply, since they are always our own metaphors 
and images, infected with our limitations, interests, and biases. (For just this 
reason we dare not claim that they have been directly revealed by God.)"!! 
On what basis is this claim made? Is it made on the basis of evidence or 
not? Presumably, Kaufman asserts this claim on the basis of what he takes 
to be adequate evidence that writings which are held as revelations exhibit 
the gamut of human foibles. But if so, Kaufman's impatience with questions 
of evidentialism cannot be general and cannot extend even to all propositions 
that utilize the concept of God, since apparently he bases his own view 
regarding God has revealed the Bible to humanity on evidence. If someone 
believes that God did, indeed, reveal the Bible to humanity, Kaufman has an 
interest in the general debate about evidentialism. Does one need evidence 
in order to hold rational beliefs about the revelatory status of the Bible? If 
not, then one could hold an opposing view on the nature of revelation in a 
properly basic fashion. Kaufman needs to consider how strong his commit-
ment to his own position on this matter ought to be. If acknowledging the 
presence of religious diversity should warrant a tentativeness about the truth 
of the Christian tradition, then acknowledging diversity on the nature of 
religious revelation will warrant tentativeness about the nature of revelation 
and, paradoxically, undercut an important support of Kaufman's claim that 
traditional theology should be scrutinized with suspicion, namely that the 
symbols and concepts embedded therein are of our invention and not of divine 
origin. 
This point is completely general and seems to indicate the following con-
clusion: it is wrong to think that there are issues that must be settled 
absolutely prior to the investigation of the rationality of belief in a given 
proposition. Of course, it is hard to see what this latter inquiry might be 
in complete ignorance of the content of the proposition. If we are evalu-
ating evidences, we cannot know what counts as evidence for the propo-
sition until we first know at least some of its content. However, Kaufman 
seems to think that we need to settle certain matters about the viability of 
a theological framework before we worry about the relevance of evidence 
to the rationality of religious belief. Yet, verdicts about rationality can 
actually mute the force of the points he raises. To the extent that one 
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rationally believes in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and loving 
creator of the world who is working to redeem it from evil, one can rationally 
believe that 'God' is a perfectly good concept to use in approaching religious 
matters. Further, to the extent that the truth-claims of other approaches con-
flict with the existence of such a being, one can rationally believe that they 
are theologically deficient approaches. While they may contain important 
truth, they are not wholly on the mark. The more theological doctrines one 
holds rationally, the more one can rationally legitimize on that basis the 
framework within which one is working. If this is right, then contemporary 
theologians should not view themselves as concerned with matters that must 
be ironed out before we bother with the question of whether belief in a 
particular system's doctrines is rational or before we bother with the question 
regarding in what such rational belief consists. Questions of rationality may 
actually save us unnecessary work in comparing religious systems and wor-
rying about which, if any, contains some truth about the world. Rational 
belief in God has forgiven my sins or God has revealed the Bible to 
humanity allows one to rationally believe in the existence of God, and this 
tacitly legitimizes theology which utilizes 'God' as a central concept. 
I think that epistemological humility may well be a virtue which some 
practitioners of the Christian faith do not possess, and that this lack of hu-
mility, when combined with other elements of our fallen nature, has led us 
to do some rather unChristian things. However, thinking that we are rational 
in believing a particular system to be true does not entail that "we try to make 
ourselves the ultimate disposers of our lives and destiny"12 and thereby usurp 
the rightful place of God. It simply means that there is something sufficiently 
positive to recommend such beliefs and that, with respect to certain beliefs, 
not everything is an irreducibly inscrutable mystery. At the same time one 
can concede that there are many things about the ways of God that we do not 
understand. The Christian tradition, at least, has plenty of grist for the humil-
ity mill; it reminds us of our proper submission to God and others. Our failure 
to heed these reminders does not count against either the truth of Christianity 
or the rationality of believing in its truth. 13 Truth is perfectly compatible with 
the admission of a great deal of ignorance and the humble treatment of those 
with whom we disagree. Whereas the doctrines of cultural, religious, and 
linguistic relativity undermine the sympathetic treatment of other systems of 
belief and their proponents, traditional Christian teaching has the resources 
to motivate and justify such sympathetic treatment. 
Nothing I have argued here shows that the Christian tradition is particularly 
well-suited for doing the best theology and for coming to grips with our 
lives in the world. Nor have I argued that there is no reason to inquire 
sympathetically about truth that may be contained in other traditions. I 
simply have tried to show that the evidences that are often brought to bear 
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against traditional theology are insufficient to warrant a shift toward more 
contemporary substitutes. In fact, to the extent that belief in traditional reli-
gious propositions is rational, whether on the basis of evidence or not, the 
shift is unwarranted. 14 
The University of Western Australia 
NOTES 
1. Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989): 35-46. 
2. Thomas V. Morris makes a similar point in his introduction to Thomas V. Morris, 
ed., Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 
1988). 
3. Kaufman, pp. 40-42. 
4. Kaufman, p. 40. 
5. Ibid. 
6. I address issues pertaining to this in "Concepts and Correspondence," Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, vol. 47 (1987), pp. 461-74 and "Correspondence 
Revisited," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 47 (1987), pp. 481-83. 
7. Op. cit., p. 41. 
8. Ibid., pp. 41-2. 
9. A helpful example of this is Loren Wilkinson, ed., Earthkeeping (Grand Rapids: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1980) where it is argued that it is nonChristian influences 
on western culture, not the influence of Christianity, that is responsible for some of our 
less than desirable attitudes and actions toward the environment. 
10. Op. cit., p. 42. 
11. Ibid., pp. 43-4. 
12. Ibid., p. 44. 
13. Our failure would count against Christianity only if there were a number of other 
things that were true. For instance, if it were part of Christianity that all who call 
themselves Christians exhibit some extraordinarily high degree of epistemological humil-
ity, then our lack of humility would indeed count against the truth of Christianity. But, I 
know of no reason to think that this is at all required by the Bible, or later Christian 
tradition. 
14. I am grateful to Catherine Blaha for reading a previous draft of this paper. 
